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Robot adoption and FDIs driven transformation in the automotive industry 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between inward Foreign Direct Investments and the adoption of 
industrial robots, across different segments of the automotive value chain. Using the International 
Federation of Robotics and fDiMarket datasets at a fine level of disaggregation of the automotive sector, 
we investigate the extent to which FDIs are related to the operational stock of industrial robots in 34 
countries over the period 2005-2014. We find distinct patterns linking FDIs and robot adoption for different 
groups of countries and for different segments of the automotive value chain, that, is assembling and 
components production. With some relevant exceptions, FDIs are found to be highly correlated with robot 
adoption in the assembling segment across major leading countries. However, this correlation becomes 
weak for components production. To explain this differential role of FDIs in robot adoption, we formulate 
hypotheses around the country-specific drivers of robotisation for the components segment by pointing to 
the role of domestic ecosystems of suppliers and industrial policy as drivers of technology absorption and 
diffusion. 
 





During the last decade, the interest towards the alleged “fourth industrial revolution” has increased 
dramatically. A set of digital technologies are expected to have a profound impact on the 
international organisation of work and production, ultimately reshaping global value chains 
(OECD, 2017; UNIDO, 2017 and 2020). With a focus on robots in the automotive industry – i.e. 
a highly dynamic and transformative digital production technology with a relatively long history 
of application to the specific industry under observation – this paper investigates some of the 
potential drivers and mechanisms underlying the adoption of such production technology across 
different countries. Specifically, we focus on the actual and potential role of Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs) in technology adoption, and provide new evidence of the relationship linking 
number of FDIs received in a specific country and the operational stock of robots within the 
automotive sector.  
 
In developing our analysis, we refer to the broader literature regarding the relationship between 
FDIs and technological upgrading of recipient countries. Are FDIs a key driver of technology 
transfer and adoption? Under which circumstances di FDI have a positive effect on the technology 
absorption and diffusion in the domestic ecosystem of companies? Are FDIs enough to trigger the 
introduction of advanced technologies such as industrial robots? What is the role played by host 
country specific factors in the adoption and diffusion of industrial robots? What are the specific 
features of the automotive sector affecting these mechanisms?  
 
Against this research agenda the paper will focus on the existence (or lack thereof) of a nexus 
between FDIs and the adoption of industrial robots in the automotive sector. We proceed in this 
direction by innovatively combining two datasets, the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) 
dataset, and fDi Markets dataset, supplied by fDi Intelligence, a specialised division of FT Ltd. 
We focus on the middle part of the automotive value chain, concerning manufacturing production 
processes. By combining descriptive statistics at different levels of analysis, we explore the extent 
to which FDIs are possibly driving the adoption of industrial robots and we formulate hypotheses 
on other complementary drivers and mechanisms. Specifically, taking advantage of the high level 
of data disaggregation and focusing on different segments of the automotive value chain – i.e. 
assembling and components production - we analyse the relationship between FDIs and patterns 
of robot adoption across 34 countries for two periods: 
i) a ten-year period (2005-2014) with a data disaggregation distinguishing two segments 
of the industry – i.e. Automotive OEM1 and Automotive Components; 
ii) a five-year period (2010-2014) considering four segments of the automotive value 
chain – i.e. ISIC Rev.4 Classes 2910 (motor vehicle assembling), 2931 (metal parts and 
plastics), 2933 (electric and electronic parts), 2939 (other parts which include seats, 
airbags, safety belts). This further level of disaggregation is only possible from 2010 
due to data constraints.  
Considering the cross-country heterogeneity in the patterns of robot adoption and the importance 
of domestic/regional value chains for technology diffusion, we formulate and explore a number of 
conjectures around the role of FDIs and additional country-specific factors that could act as drivers 
for robotisation. Special attention will be given to the potential role played in different countries 
by their domestic industrial ecosystem of suppliers and industrial policy incentives, that is, the 
extent to which a more or less developed domestic supply-chain and incentive packages can drive 
                                                 
1 Original Equipment Manufacturer. The term generally refers to the original producer of components. In the automotive sector it 
is used as a synonym of car producing companies, i.e., the final assemblers. 
 
robots adoption and diffusion in the sector. We do so in the attempt to answer the main research 
question of the paper regarding the existence (or lack thereof) of correlation between FDIs and the 
increasing adoption of industrial robots at different segments of the automotive industry.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a selective review of the literature on the 
relationship between FDIs and technical change, which we use to inform our research questions. 
We will consider both standard literature and more recent contributions which take into account 
global value chain mechanisms and local industrial policies, which are notably a crucial aspect of 
automotive sector dynamics. Section 3 considers the main features and trends that shaped the 
automotive sector in the last decades. Sections 4 and 5 present our sources of data and engage in a 
series of descriptive statistics to show different types of correlation (or absence thereof) between 
FDIs and robot adoption. Section 6 discusses our data and put forward some possible explanations 
based on alternative views on technological upgrading and industrialisation. 
 
2. Foreign Direct Investments and Technical Change 
A wide range of academic researchers have devoted their attention to the role of FDIs in 
stimulating growth and development. More specifically, the focus on technology spillovers and 
the associated learning opportunities have been increasingly covering an important part of the 
research on FDIs. Being the linchpin of this study on a specific production technology, e.g. 
industrial robots, and being the literature explicitly linking industrial robots and FDIs quite scant, 
we firstly engage in reviewing contributions on FDIs and technical change at a more general level.  
Since the 1980s, the role of FDIs and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in promoting growth, 
employment, and economic diversification in emerging and developing countries has been widely 
debated. The literature and policy debates have recognised that FDIs can trigger productive 
transformation, however only to some extent and under specific conditions. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, several concerns about the limited – and in some cases damaging – impact of MNCs 
and their FDIs in developing countries were raised, in particular with respect to their contribution 
to high quality industrialisation and technology transfer (Lall, 1978, 1979; Safarian, 1999).  
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the structural transformation experience of some of the late 
industrialisers softened these critical perspectives. First, positive experiences of productive, 
technological and organisational capabilities development started to emerge across a number of 
late industrialisers, especially in South and East Asia, in particular among those countries who 
developed a strategic engagement with MNCs (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989; for more recent 
contributions see Andreoni and Chang, 2019; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). This strategic 
engagement resulted in the establishment of joint ventures and increasing technology transfer, the 
absorption of global production technologies and standards, which led to the development of 
domestic supply chains through localisation policies alongside global value chain integration (Lall, 
2000; Mpanju, 2012). Second, the accelerating pace of technological change (UNCTAD, 2018), 
together with the rising cost of innovation, contributed in viewing MNCs as a strategic asset, and 
often the only way to link up to new global waves of innovation and technologies.  
Despite the rising role of MNCs and FDIs in emerging economies, the evidence of their impact on 
economic and technological upgrading of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) remains mixed, both 
in terms of technology absorption (through direct and indirect effects) and of technology diffusion. 
The next two sections review and unpack how technology absorption and diffusion have being 
analysed and supporting empirical evidence.  
2.1 Direct and Indirect Effects 
A standard distinction in the literature is between direct and indirect effects of FDIs on host 
economies  (Zanfei, 2012; Castellani et al., 2015).  
 
First, a substantial body of literature found a positive direct effect of inward FDIs on the host 
economies mainly in terms of: (i) changes in the composition of industry, as FDIs bring in bundles 
of competencies and knowledge assets that increase the overall productivity level of the recipient 
economy (Dunning, 1993; Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Criscuolo and Martin, 2009; 
Castellani et al., 2015; Denisia, 2010); (ii) employment creation, especially when MNCs contribute 
to import substitution and to the expansion of a country’s export capacity (Ncunu, 2011; Chaudhuri 
and Banerjee, 2010 for FDI in agriculture).  
 
With specific reference to low- and middle-income countries as recipient economies, Vacaflores 
(2011) studied the relationship between FDIs and employment in 12 Latin American countries and 
found a positive and significant effect. Latin American countries were among the highest recipients 
of FDIs starting from the 1980s but, once compared to other regions like South East Asia or Eastern 
Europe, the impact of FDI was much weaker in terms of employment growth and other parameters 
of industrial upgrading and competitiveness (Zhang, 2001). In contrast to these fast industrialisers, 
countries like Mexico did not engage strategically with MNCs, on the contrary their approach was 
one of “passive open-door policy with limited policy interventions and no industrial policy” (Lall, 
1995). As a result, if we look at Mexico as an example, while the development of the auto cluster 
was impressive – export grew 18% a year over 1994-2002 – the country grew at a modest 3% and 
the expected automotive multiplier did not materialise (Mortimore and Vargara, 2004).  
 
Second, for what concerns indirect effects on host economies, these occur through changes in the 
capabilities, strategies and performance of local firms, especially their value addition. The standard 
assumption is that FDIs will determine some kind of technological externalities, contributing to 
shifts in the local firms’ production function, or pecuniary externalities, determining shifts in the 
local firms’ profit function (Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Newman et al., 2014; Santos and Khan, 
2018) . Empirical evidence on these impacts is more controversial. Some studies found evidence 
of technological upgrading at a general level, where local firms learnt from MNCs by observing 
technologies employed by international actors and attracting employees trained by the same actors 
(Borensztein et al., 1998; Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999 for a study on Indonesia; Meyer, 2004). 
While the results based on cross-sector analysis revealed a positive impact of FDIs (see for 
example Makki and Somwaru, 2004; Aykut and Sayek, 2007), due to the fact that international 
activities take place in better performing countries, the availability of longitudinal firm level data 
has led to explore spillovers effects of multinational presence across and within industries, leading 
to less clear-cut results. In fact, a number of studies have found null or even negative impact of 
FDIs on the performance of host economies (Gorg and Greenaway 2004).  
 
Moreover, it is important to stress the difference in FDI effects occurring across countries at 
different stages of development. Although empirical research shows a positive correlation between 
FDIs and productivity in developed countries (Caves, 1974 on Australia; Globerman, 1979 on 
Canada; Pain and Hubert, 2000 on the United Kingdom), the picture becomes less clear when 
studies focus on developing countries that do not have sufficiently advanced and well-structured 
industrial ecosystems (see Andreoni, 2018 for a theoretical discussion and empirical analysis of 
industrial ecosystems). Xu (2000) carried out a study about more than 40 countries and found 
positive technology transfer in developed countries but not in developing countries. Similarly, 
positive effects are found on FDIs in manufacturing firms in the United States but not in Mexico 
and Venezuela (Atiken et al., 1996). Mixed results are found in a study on Uruguay where there 
are positive effects of FDIs but only in firms with small technological gaps (Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm, 1999). Referring to emerging economies, Hanson (2001) claimed that positive effects 
are very few and Gorg and Greenaway (2004) that most effects would be negative. A broader set 
of contributions adopting more granular mixed-methods has found that FDIs are not beneficial per 
se and that capabilities improvements and learning depend on local firms’ absorptive capacity 
(Kokko 1994), on technological gaps separating foreign and local firms as a source of 
technological opportunities (Findlay 1978, Blomstrom and Wolff 1997, Castellani and Zanfei 
2003), on catching up potential (Meyer and Sinani, 2009), and on the nature of activities involved 
(Castellani et al. 2015; ).  
 
2.2 Insights from global value chains and local production systems literatures 
In the last two decades, the impact of FDIs on hosting countries has been increasingly studied 
through the analytical lenses of global value chains (GVCs). The GVCs literature points at the 
existence of two critical factors mediating the relationship between FDIs and technology diffusion, 
i.e., governance and upgrading within and along value chains (Gereffi 1994, 1999 and 2018; 
Gereffi and Lee, 2016; Ponte et al., 2019; Sturgeon, 2009). First, different types of GVC 
governance systems determine the ways in which MNCs manage, organize and orchestrate their 
suppliers on a ‘glo-cal’ scale and potentially result in ‘endogenous asymmetries’ (Milberg and 
Winkler, 2013). Second, upgrading – understood as a positive shift in the competitive position of 
a firm within and along value chains – depends on several institutional and economic actors in the 
process of local productive capabilities and linkages development (Gereffi and Lee, 2016; 
Andreoni, 2019; Dallas et al., 2019).  
 
Despite the importance that this approach gives to understanding the interrelations at a global level, 
the sectoral characteristics are still important for many reasons. The ability of countries to link up 
through backward linkages, and then either add value forward or remain upstream, is strongly 
related to the specific sectors and  types of FDIs a country is able to attract and the types of linkages 
that develop from and around the FDIs (Andreoni, 2019). Value creation and spaces for learning 
and development are distributed unevenly across value chains in different sectors (Andreoni and 
Chang, 2017), most often involving a fine-slicing of production and R&D activities also within 
sectors (Mudambi 2009, Papanastassiou et al. 2019). 
The Local Production System (LPS) framework (Andreoni, 2019) points to the importance of 
looking at different types of linkages in a developing country’s production system, how they 
develop both vertically along the FDI-driven global value chain and horizontally in the local 
economy at the intersection of several sectoral value chains and other actors (including public ones 
such as industrial research intermediate institutions and services providers). The local production 
system is made of multiple types of production, technological, consumption and fiscal linkages 
which are based on the existence of specific set of capabilities. This framework points to the 
importance of focusing on the productive, technological and organisational capabilities of local 
firms, linkages development across industries, institutions and political economy factors 
(Hirschman, 1958; Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Lall, 2000; Andreoni, 2019; Andreoni and 
Chang, 2019) as well as the nature of investment projects and the technological level of investors 
(Castellani and Zanfei 2003, 2006).   
Considering the multiple factors suggested within the GVCs and LPS, we can conclude that 
technology spillovers may not accrue when host economies have a weak industrial base – 
therefore, FDIs might trigger low or no technological upgrading effects (in our specific case, 
robotisation) when occurring in local environments that are not responsive to the stimuli of foreign 
capital injections. In this sense, capability creation, absorptive capacity and production linkages 
are a key concern when considering spillovers to the rest of the economy (Jindra et al., 2009; 
Zanfei and Saliola, 2009; Meyer and Sinani, 2009) and different types of value chain integration 
(Ponte and Gereffi, 2019; Andreoni, 2019).  
 
3. Industry context: how fragmentation of production and concentration of power 
shaped the automotive sector 
 
When studying the relationship between FDIs and robotisation, a focus on the automotive sector 
is particularly relevant due to three specific structural characteristics of this industry. That is, its 
GVC structure and concentration, its early adoption of robots and the geographical distribution of 
its activities. 
 
First, the fragmentation of production and the huge amount of FDIs resulting from both 
outsourcing and concentration trends, deeply reshaped the industry and contributed to the 
‘producer-driven’ definition of the automotive GVC (Gereffi, 1994). The automotive GVC is 
characterised by a small set of final assemblers with relatively high market power, an increasingly 
exclusive club of Tier 1 suppliers, which are also becoming closer to the final OEMs (Wong, 
2017), and a series of Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers which are more dispersed despite being 
increasingly controlled by OEMs.  The last decades have witnessed a consolidation in the 
automaker markets around sixteen major players. In 2015, ten OEMs accounted for three quarters 
of global production with the top five accounting for 50% of total production (International 
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, 2015)2. Global firm leaders focus on the design 
part of vehicles that is where an important share of the value added lies (Sjoestedt, 1987). Pre-
production and engineers activities, “where conceptual designs are translated into the parts and 
sub-systems that can be assembled into a drivable vehicle, remain centralized in or near the design 
clusters that have arisen near the headquarters of lead firms” (Sturgeon et al., 2008: 8). 
 
This concentration phenomenon has been accompanied by the rise of first tier mega suppliers. 
Over the past four decades component manufacturers dropped from 40.000 in 1970 to less than 
3000 in 2015 (Wong, 2017). Hence, fewer larger first-tier suppliers have survived and consolidated 
while, at the same time, they have developed close relationship with big OEMs. In this emerging 
configuration of the automotive value chain, OEMs still control and manage the entire supply 
chain. However, since OEMs are the mere final assembler of the product à la Foxconn (McGee, 
2016), they put pressure on their suppliers, especially Tier 1, and have forced them to take 
increasing responsibilities in investments and supply chain management. Indeed, given the small 
number of global automotive firms and their strong purchasing power, suppliers can be forced 
towards the adoption of specific standards, information systems and even production technologies. 
As pointed out by Sturgeon et al. (2009), “with consolidation, we must question the staying power 
                                                 
2 The forecast of production engineered by the leading OEM (less than 10) is 83% of global output in light vehicles (IHS Markit, 
2018) 
of smaller, lower tier, local suppliers” and, thus, the increasing “endogenous asymmetries” along 
the value chain in different countries (Milberg and Winkler, 2013). Indeed, the relationship 
between OEMs and suppliers appear to follow similar global benchmarks, but can also develop 
differently in different country contexts. 
 
Second, the automotive sector absorbs almost 37% of the total number of industrial robots 
worldwide (IFR, 2015), a share which makes it the top sector for adoption of robots. Automotive 
has benefitted from a continuous technology push, stemming from investment in automated 
production technologies from major car producers since the 1970s. The automotive sector has 
always been the bedrock of manufacturing automation advances due to its high-volume 
production, standardisation and production and product modularisation. This characterisation 
stems from the degree of transnational dispersion of production in automotive industry 
(Birkinshaw J. et al., 2016; Winroth and Bennett, 2017; Serfati and Sauviat, 2019). Moreover, the 
automotive sector provides an effective illustration of the possibility that companies can create and 
well manage long-distance business relationships (Sturgeon and Lee, 2005).  
 
Third, the automotive sector is characterised by sectoral and market dynamics resulting in a 
specific spatial organisation and distribution of production. The fragmentation of automotive 
production is based on networks that tend to organise regionally, much more than globally (Jetin, 
2018). Regionalisation was favoured by the widespread adoption of modularisation in the 1990s 
(Sako, 2003) and by the importance to be ‘next-door’ to car assemblers, especially for Tier 1 
suppliers that are located close to (when not fully integrated with) assembly plants, in order to 
better synchronise just-in-time-delivery of complex modular units (Frigant and Lung, 2002).  
 
MNEs are key actors affecting the characteristics of automotive industry which we have 
highlighted; they contribute to industrial concentration, as well as to technology diffusion and to 
the geographic dispersion of production. The role played by FDIs in robot adoption in particular 
makes a special case that needs to be explored from this perspective . Sections 4 and 5 will provide 
some evidence in this sense.  
 
4. Data  
This study builds on the use of two innovative sources of data that have not been matched before, 
to the best of our knowledge. The paper undertakes a quantitative approach, based on the analysis 
of secondary data that have been collected by international organisations, namely the fDi 
Intelligence of the Financial Times for the fDi market dataset and the International Federation of 
Robotics for data on industrial robots. FDIs data and industrial robot data are combined through 
some descriptive statistics so to explore correlations between  industrial robot adoption and FDIs. 
We added a further element to this, as we unpack the automotive sector into two main sub segments 
of its value chain, e.g. automotive assembly and automotive components, and we observe the 
relationship between FDIs and industrial robots along these two segments for 2005-2014.  
 
International Federation of Robotics dataset collects data on the diffusion of industrial robots, 
produced by nearly all industrial robots suppliers world-wide (IFR, 2015). According to 
International Organisation for Standardization, an industrial robot is defined as: “an automatically 
controlled, reprogrammable, multi-purpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, 
which may be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications” (IFR, 
2015)3. Based on this definition, the IFR dataset provides provides data on the number of robots 
by industry following ISIC rev. 4 classification, by country and per year. Moreover, for the 
automotive sector IFR dataset provides also a sub-classification of different segments of the value 
chain. Data on stock of robots are expressed in number of units adopted.  
 
fDi Markets database is an online dataset that compiles data on cross-border investment projects 
with details on the sectors and sub sectors, whose classification corresponds to NACE Rev.2 or 
NAICS 07, on industry activities (i.e. the business functions involved in the FDI project, including 
inter alia: Manufacturing, R&D, Design Development and Testing, HeadQuarter services, Sales 
and Logistics) and on locations of investments with different degrees of geographical aggregation. 
Out of more than 142,000 observations of investments to which we have access over the 2003-
2014 period, we use investments in the automotive industry, considering the two industry sectors 
Automotive OEM and Automotive Components. Among the numerous valuable pieces of 
information that fDi Markets provides, we use destination_country, year, industry_activity and 
sub_sector. Out of all industry activities detected for automotive industry and for its sub-sectors 
                                                 
3 https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso: 8373:ed-2:v1:en 
we considered just Manufacturing activities (hence excluding sales, R&D and headquarter 
services, etc.), in order to provide full consistency with the other data coming from IFR which are 
just related to manufacturing applications of industrial robots. In addition, to match our two 
sources of data we use a conversion table supplied by the US Bureau of Census4. 
 
We refer to 34 countries, which constitute almost 97% the robots' adoptions and 99% of the inward 
FDIs in the automotive sector. Tables 1 and 2 use data from our main sources to highlight the 
geographic concentration of industrial robot adoption and of FDIs in the automotive industry: the 
top 5 countries account for almost 60% of inward FDIs in this sector, while the top 5 adopting 













Japan 113526 21%  China 151774.28 24% 
US* 98569 18%  Mexico  63355 10% 
Germany 93082 17%  US 55030 9% 
China 67570 12%  India 51921.74 8% 
South Korea 58024 11%  Brazil 45657.46 7% 
Italy 16940 3%  Russia  41887.96 7% 
France 15272 3%  Canada  24824 4% 
Spain 14179 3%  Spain 21855.52 3% 
United Kingdom 9989 2%  Thailand 19336.18 3% 
Thailand 6652 1%  UK 17634.03 3% 
Mexico* 6604 1%  Poland  16639.42 3% 
Brazil 5518 1%  Slovakia  12839.45 2% 
India 5180 1%  Turkey 11924.78 2% 
Czech Republic 5111 1%  Hungary  10863.1 2% 
Canada* 4627 1%  Czech Republic  10451.64 2% 
Belgium 3871 1%  Romania  9776.9 2% 
Sweden 3505 1%  Indonesia  9705.49 2% 
Slovakia 3092 1%  South Korea  7352.61 1% 
Turkey 2578 less than 1%  Germany  7135.77 1% 
Poland 2495 less than 1%  Argentina  6983.47 1% 
Austria 2041 less than 1%  South Africa 6145.99 1% 
Hungary 1818 less than 1%  Belgium  5997.97 1% 
South Africa 1411 less than 1%  Australia 4288.39 1% 
Portugal 1172 less than 1%  Austria  3748.33 1% 
Russia 1129 less than 1%  Portugal  3576.99 1% 
Netherlands 1064 less than 1%  Vietnam 3305.62 1% 
Argentina 999 less than 1%  France 3029.3 less than 1% 
Romania 736 less than 1%  Malaysia 1826.01 less than 1% 
Finland 459 less than 1%  Sweden 1759.2 less than 1% 
                                                 
4 http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html) from NAICS to ISIC rev. 4. 
Indonesia 393 less than 1%  Italy 1705.87 less than 1% 
Malaysia 256 less than 1%  Netherlands  1151.74 less than 1% 
Australia 228 less than 1%  Japan  602.43 less than 1% 
Denmark 181 less than 1%  Denmark  254.3 less than 1% 
Vietnam  10 less than 1%  Finland  97.6 less than 1% 
Total 2014 548281 around 97%  Total 2014 634438.54 around 99% 
                     
  Table 1 and 2: Authors’ elaborations on IFR and fDiMarkets data (2005-2014)                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
The automotive segments we consider for our analysis are: ISIC 2910 motor vehicle manufacturing 
(OEM assembly), 2931 metal and plastic parts, 2933 electric/electronic parts and 2939 other parts, 
which includes car seats, airbags and safety belts. As aforementioned, we analyse the relationship 
between FDIs and industrial robots across 34 countries for two periods: i) a ten-year period (2005-
2014) with a data disaggregation distinguishing two segments of the industry – i.e. Automotive 
OEM and Automotive Components; ii) five-year period (2010-2014) considering four segments 
of the automotive value chain – i.e. 2910 (motor vehicle assembling), 2931 (metal parts and 
plastics), 2933 (electric and electronic parts), 2939 (other parts which include seats, airbags, safety 
belts). Section 5 will present our two parts of the analysis. 
 
Although the two datasets present extremely rich and detailed information, they do have some 
limitations. First, within the automotive classification there are two unspecified classes, which are 
Unspecified AutoParts (class 2999) and Automotive Unspecified (class 299). We inserted sub-
class 2999 within the auto component sub-class and redistributed 299 proportionally between Auto 
Assembly and Auto Parts. Instead, for the bubble graphs at four sectors disaggregation below we 
could not insert any of these classes5. The second limitation is due to the fact that up until 2010 
IFR data referring to the United States, Mexico and Canada were aggregated. Figures for Canada 
and Mexico started “from zero” in 2010 when they were disaggregated.   
 
5. Stylised facts on the relationships between FDIs and robotisation 
The analytical investigation of the relationship between FDIs and robotisation is structured in two 
main steps – comparative and dynamic – and, for each of them, we identify patterns at different 
levels of disaggregation of the automotive industry. By doing so we aim at capturing first the 
                                                 
5 We contacted the administrators of IFR dataset in Germany and after a careful analysis we claimed that these data could not be 
inserted in any other classes. 
heterogeneous rate of robotisation across different countries and segments of the automotive value 
chain;  and second how they have followed different patterns over the last two decades. 
 
5.1 Comparative analysis  
We conducted our first comparative analysis at two levels of disaggregation and used descriptive 
statistics to show the relationship between FDIs inflow and industrial robots adoption within the 
two segments 2910 (Automotive OEMs) and 2930 (Automotive Components). Figure 1 and 2 
present the distribution between industrial robots in these two segments and inward FDIs. Our aim 
is to show how different countries are placed differently according to the automotive segments 
each graph refers to. While it is not surprising to find the biggest automotive players in the top 
right quadrant, with these graphs we aim to emphasise the different position of developed, 
emerging and developing countries between the Assembly and the Components segments.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of FDIs at the OEMs level; we use the sum of inward FDIs 
between 2005 and 2014 and the stock of industrial robots in the same time frame. Although the 
lack of strong correlation is an interesting finding per se, as it points to high heterogeneity even 
for the assembly segment of the automotive sector, interesting patterns emerge once these 
scatterplots are divided into quadrants.  
 
Figure 1: Automotive assembly FDIs and industrial robots 
 
Source: Authors based on IFR and fDi Markets data, 2005-2014 data.  
 
At the top of Figure 1, there are either industrialised countries or fast industrialisers: the upper left 
quadrant includes developed economies, which have a strong presence of industrial robots in their 
automotive industry but do not attract a high number of FDIs (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Germany, 
Italy). Interestingly these are all countries that undertook important transformation plans to shift 
their entire economy towards automated production. If we look just at the automotive sector, this 
occurred despite a relative lower number of FDIs if compared to developed countries on the top 
right quadrant. Instead, in the upper right quadrant one finds countries where the increasing 
number of FDIs seems to be correlated more with the increase in robots adoption. These are 
countries that either have a long tradition in the sector and still play a pivotal role attracting FDIs 
(e.g. United Kingdom and Spain) or they are big attractors of FDIs and rapidly industrialising 
countries (e.g. China, Mexico within North America, and to some extent Brazil). In the bottom 
part of the graph there are both developed countries with a modest automotive sector and emerging 
economies, such as the Eastern European countries, linked up to the German automotive value 
chain. Dynamic economies such as Thailand,  Turkey, Russia and India are also present in the right 
part of the graph, thus showing both a relatively high degree of attractiveness for FDIs and a 
general upgrade of the OEMs-related production processes (especially Turkey); these are countries 
growing a lot as a result of policies that encourage the development of the automotive sector as 
well as opening doors to FDIs (Barnes and Black, 2017).   
 
Automotive components graph distribution across countries is presented in Figure 2. Within the 
top quadrants (i.e., with a large number of robots), as expected, we find industrialised countries 
with a highly developed automotive sector. Among emerging economies in the upper quadrants, 
the only case (apart from China) is Thailand, which is catching up quickly, also as a result of a 
new and dynamic automotive sector (Deloitte, 2019). This example could indicate that Thailand 
was not only able to attract an important number of FDIs, but it has also been able to channel them 
in the direction of technological diffusion and upgrade via development of supply chains of 
components producers (Sadoi, 2012). Other countries, such as India, Brazil and Russia received 
more FDIs than Thailand, but their respective auto components segments use fewer industrial 
robots (IFR, 2015). A final consideration on these first graphs is that the better position that Thai 
components’ segment has vis a vis its OEMs one (previous graph) is an element that suggests the 
presence of an important system of local suppliers. Differently, taking as an example the sluggish 
position of South Africa’s auto components, it confirms the low number of suppliers’ activities 
both in terms of international activities (FDIs) and in terms of local technological pull (Black A. 
et al., 2017).    
 
Figure 2: Auto components FDIs and industrial robots 
 
Source: Authors based on IFR and fDi Markets data, 2005-2014 data.  
  
 
5.2 Dynamic analysis 
The second part of our analysis presents a series of bubble graphs that intend to show the trend of 
FDIs and industrial robot adoption across different segments of the automotive value chain at a 
finer level of disaggregation and over time. We use this tool as it allows us to plot on the same 
graph our two variables of FDIs and industrial robots against a time dimension on the horizontal 
axis. The analysis takes advantage of the high disaggregation of our data that is possible for the 
2010-14 period, thereby allowing us to consider the following four industry segments: 2910 (motor 
vehicle assembling), 2931 (metal parts and plastics), 2933 (electric and electronic parts), 2939 
(other parts which include seats, airbags, safety belts). When we indicate 2930 we refer to the sum 
of all components parts (2931, 2933, 2939). In order to build these graphs, we considered the 20 
countries (from Table 2) that received the largest amounts of FDIs in the automotive sector in the 
period 2010-2014. The bubble graphs presented in Figure 3 and 4 correlate three variables, using 
the value of FDIs inflow (vertical axis), the number of robots (the size of the bubble), and how this 
relation changes over a four-years’ time horizon (horizontal axis). Figure 3 depicts an interesting 
dynamic relation between FDIs and industrial robots across time and across different segments of 
the value chain.  
 
First, vehicle assembly segment (2910) is characterised by a stable and massive use of robots (the 
size of the bubble) and a decreasing level of FDIs (except in the final year), the latter presumably 
as a consequence of the global financial crisis and the impact on global demand of automotive and 
of cars in particular (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010). However, the global crisis affected 
countries differently. While hitting severely American and, to a less extent, European companies 
supported by intense cross border activities, the crisis gave at the same time the opportunity to 
Indian and Chinese auto manufacturers to expand their markets and to become world players 
(UNIDO, 2009; Bai, 2012). In this sense, FDIs dynamics are also very much related to global and 
especially developed world’s demand cycles. The increase of FDIs in 2014 went in parallel with 
the first increase in car registration in the European market after six years of recession (Rosemain, 
2014).  
 
Second, auto components sectors (2931, 2933 and 2939) appear to follow a different pattern, which 
is less related to major shocks at the global level; in fact, in 2012, one the most problematic years 
for motor assemblers, sees a peack in both FDIs and in industrial robots’ adoption for component 
manufacturers. This could suggest that FDIs in assembling (OEMs) and in components segments 
of the value chain operate differently.  While FDIs in all automotive segments fluctuate 
significantly, and particularly so in the assembly stage, the adoption of industrial robots is slow 
but pretty stable, showing that this production technology is steadily becoming more diffused in 
the industry, with a remarkable increase in the case of components. Therefore, the adoption of 
robots and the presence of inward FDIs are not clearly correlated over time, although some 
evidence exists that the relation is negative in the case of assembly and slightly positive in the case 
of components at least in the first part of the examined period. We replicated the same exercise in 
Figure 4 with a two level disaggregation so to better highlight how assembly and components 
segments behave differently.  
 
 
Figure 3: FDIs and industrial robots’ distribution across four segments in time 
  
Source: Author based on IFR and fDi Markets data. Vertical axis: FDI intensity; Horizontal axis: year; 
Size of the bubble: N. of robots (stock); Colour of the bubbles: different subsectors. 
 
 
Figure 4: FDIs and industrial robots’ distribution across two segments (assembly and 
parts) 
 
Source: Author based on IFR and fDi Markets data. Vertical axis: FDI intensity; Horizontal 
axis: year; Size of the bubble: N. of robots (stock); Colour of the bubbles: different subsectors. 
 
 
Figure 5 zooms into Figure 3 with a focus only on the auto components segment. A closer look at 
different sub-segments of auto components reveals further heterogeneity within this segment, and 
this may have to do with the specific characteristics of production processes and technologies 
required for different auto components. Examining in detail the reasons underlying these 
differences is beyond the scope of this paper6. Suffice here to observe diverging patterns of FDI 
and robot adoption: Metal parts (2931, the green bubbles in Figure 5) show a peak of FDIs in 2012 
and a steady substantial increase in industrial robots; airbag, safety belts and seats (2939, yellow 
bubbles) present a pretty stable, slightly decreasing, level of FDIs investments with a stable 
increase in the use of industrial robots. Electrical and electronic parts (2933, the blue bubbles) are 
attracting an important number of FDIs but they still present a small, although increasing, number 
of industrial robots.  
 
Figure 5: FDIs and industrial robots’ distribution across three sub-segments of components parts 
                                                 
6  
Although there are a number of reasons underlying this heterogeneity in robots adoption across different components, one of the 
main ones is related to the degrees of freedom that companies have in automating (or not) their production processes for specific 
components. For instance, an important number of metal parts’ operations have to be produced automatically due to quality and 
safety reasons, no matter where they are produced. Some specific spot welding and laser welding operations are characterised by 
operational tasks that, for the quality and ergonomics of the process, can be only automated. Differently, the production of seats or 
airbags are mainly constituted by operations that could be automated (and they are likely to be increasingly automated) but can still 





Source: Author based on IFR and fDi Markets data. Vertical axis: FDI intensity; Horizontal 





Interestingly, the more we focus on countries at the technological frontier the more robots tend to 
be used across more segments of the automotive value chain, including some of those which are 
traditionally more labour-intensive. For instance, looking at NAFTA and Germany (Figure 6), 
even production of electric/electronic parts (grey bubble) and leather/synthetic seats and airbags 
(yellow bubble) appear to be associated with the adoption of an important number of robots. For 
illustrative purposes we focus on a selection of countries which have different degrees of 
involvement in the global automotive value chain7, and we observed that there is no strong 
correlation between the number of robots adopted and the inflow of FDIs. This is visualized in 
Figure 6 as there is presence of big sized bubbles even in relation to a relatively small amount of 
inward FDIs (e.g., see Germany).  
 
Figure 6: Relation between FDIs and robot’s adoption, four-subsectors (country focus)  
                                                 
7 For all of these countries unclassified robots represent less than 5% of all adopted robots over the period we considered.  
 
Source: Author based on IFR and fDi Markets data. Vertical axis: FDI intensity; Horizontal axis: 




6. Discussion  
The automotive sector is characterised by specific dynamics that influence the distribution of its 
international activities. More than truly global, over the last decades the sector has increasingly 
clustered in specific regional areas, the most important of which are NAFTA, Germany and 
Eastern Europe, East Asia, Argentina/Brazil to a certain extent and, more recently, China. 
Historically, the automotive sector has been a major driver of industrialisation in several successful 
country experiences. The length and complexity of its value chain, alongside the development of 
production and technological complementarities, allowed countries involved in the automotive 
sector to achieve several goals.  
 
The automotive sector has also been a fertile field for many improvements in production 
technologies, being the sector characterised by intensive economies of scale and by the use of 
automated machines since the 1970s (Sjoestedt, 1978). Industrial robots were not an exception in 
this respect, and the first introduction of spot welding and arc welding robots took place in the 
automotive sector (APO, 1987). The use of industrial robots, despite not being recent, experienced 
a growth due to improvements in technologies, the consequent increase in productivity and, to a 
certain extent, flexibility.  
 
Our descriptive statistics suggest that it is difficult to claim strong correlation between inward FDIs 
and industrial robots’ adoption in the automotive sector, especially when we look for patterns 
across different segments of the value chain – assembling and components production – and for 
different types of components. However, there exist some interesting FDI related patterns that 
characterise the adoption of new technologies. That is, the heterogeneity of FDIs-led robotisation 
especially when comparing the Automotive OEM with Automotive Components. Building on the 
literature, existing evidence and our new descriptive analyses, we formulate the following three 
sets of considerations and hypotheses for further research. 
 
First, Automotive OEMs clearly are the main drivers of robotization; if we look at the number of 
robots (e.g. the size of the bubbles), OEMs encompass the majority of industrial robots (IFR, 
2015).  This is largely expected because OEMs are large in size, have a high market power and 
have the capacity to invest in new technologies and because of the operations they perform. The 
assembly of a motor vehicle requires an increasing number of robots in the pressing shop, the body 
shop and the paint shop. Thus, we glimpse two main dynamics that develop as effect of FDIs from 
big OEMs. On the one hand, they are the first adopters of industrial robots in their new facilities, 
and this is increasingly the case with the increase in quality standards and safety issues that led to 
the introduction of, for instance, electrostatic coating in the paint shop and different types of new 
laser and spot welding robotic cells in the press shop and body shop. On the other hand, they could 
also activate foreign capital inflows involving components suppliers, especially big international 
Tier 1 suppliers which are closely linked to OEM operations. In this sense, since OEMs are the 
leading actor for organisational and technological innovation, they also have the power and ability 
to manage the modular production and the mastering of new technologies both at the plant level 
and along the supply chain (Jacobides et al., 2015).   
 
Second, FDIs-induced robotisation driven by OEMs is however not sufficient to fully explain our 
data when we look at robotisation in the components’ segments of the automotive value chain.  It 
appears that FDIs per se are not a crucial driver for this segment of the value chain. First, as shown 
in our bubble graphs, there is no correspondence between the amount of FDIs and the increase in 
robots’ adoption (the size of our bubbles, see Figure 5) over time. Instead, it seems that the 
diffusion of industrial robots is a steady, although slow, trend that continued to increase despite 
the decrease both in inward auto components FDIs and the use of industrial robots at the OEMs 
level. While significant differences emerge across segments of the automotive industry, these 
unclear correlations between FDIs and robotisation over time might reflect a remarkable 
heterogeneity of FDI induced adoption patterns also across countries. 
 
Third, the most successful countries in terms of industrial robot adoption in the components 
segment, such as Thailand, Czech Republic and Turkey, have adopted consistent policy packages 
at the national level in order to attract FDIs while boosting complementary aspects (e.g. education, 
infrastructure, R&D incentives) for technology upgrade (see Barnes et al., 2017 for Thailand; 
Taymaz and Yilmaz, 2017 for Turkey (although they state that the success is mitigated by the lack 
of organizational capabilities); Hill, 2007 for Czech Republic). In other words, these countries 
made a general effort to improve their position in global value chains including both FDI attraction 
and a conscious effort to upgrade their local production system towards the development of an 
ecosystem of domestic suppliers. An industrial ecosystem is based on the development of a series 
of complementarities based on the existence of linkages between close but dissimilar types of 
firms. Firms and organisation that are linked to each other along sectoral value chains (vertical 
linkages), and across different sectors (horizontal linkages) trigger the development of 
complementary capabilities (Andreoni, 2019). Thailand is one example in this sense. It is the 
developing country (China excluded) with the highest number of industrial robots, and one of the 
highest in the automotive sector (IFR, 2015). The ‘robotisation’ of the country is based on a series 
of policies that aim at building up the local ecosystem. Demand and supply policies have been 
combined in a way where technological skills push met demand pull in a country where firms have 
been ‘accompanied’ by fiscal incentives to adopt industrial robots. Lastly, a wide range of enabling 
institutions and infrastructures permitted the Thai government to provide the right set up for firms 
both local and international (Barnes et al., 2016). Because components production suppliers are 
more fragmented than big OEM assemblers, they rely on a series of close complementarities that 
can be fully developed and explored in geographical proximity with OEMs and with the right 
incentives provided from government, MNCs and other local intermediate actors. This third set of 
consideration restates the importance of strategic engagements with FDIs in the host economy, 
including restricting the scope and modalities of operation of MNCs, especially with respect to 
their engagement with domestic suppliers. High technologies require time to be absorbed and 
mastered and they build up on production systems that are complex and need to be adapted to local 
conditions. And this is why to strengthen the relationship between FDI and robotisation, FDIs 
should be strategically managed through appropriate industrial policy. 
 
 
7. Conclusion   
This paper examines the relationship between inward FDIs and industrial robots’ adoption, 
disaggregating the automotive sector and looking at how FDIs and industrial robots are distributed 
across different segments of the value chain. The granularity of our data permits to innovatively 
combine two crucial information for the automotive sector: inward FDIs and process technology 
upgrade. This is a first, largely descriptive attempt to explore the relation between FDIs and robots’ 
adoption, as a manifestation of how FDIs could act as a trigger for a technological upgrade. We 
found that different segments of the value chain as well as different groups of countries are 
characterised by distinct patterns of FDIs and robot adoption. While FDIs play a role for the 
adoption of robots in the OEMs segment (particularly of emerging countries), it seems less the 
case for the components segment. We put forward some potential explanations for this, specifically 
focussing on the role that structural characteristics of the industry and policy play in shaping the 
trajectory of industrial robots’ adoption.   
Our study has important limitations. First, we cannot claim any causality. This is an exploratory 
study that only aims to shed some lights on heterogenous dynamics of robotisation. We pointed to 
correlations that exist in some cases and do not show up in others, and puts forth some conjectures 
on the possible determinants of such correlations (and absence thereof). Second, the existence of 
unspecified classes is particularly limiting in the disaggregation at four segments. Nonetheless, our 
results open for a new stream of research that goes beyond the existent empirical literature on the 
new technologies, which remains at the macro level and mainly focusses on the impact of robotics 
on labour. We have highlighted the importance of studies at a fine-grained sectoral level, which 
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